The Battle of Algiers simply reiterates the idea of the faceless enemy. Many of America's wars have been against uniformed men in column. Those conflicts are easily won. A minority of our battles, however. have been against guerillas; Vietnam, Somalia, et. cetera. We lost for a reason, there was no clear enemy. France lost Indochina and Algeria on the same basis. Who was Amer...er...France to shoot at? As the review claimed; in conflicts such as these, both sides lose something. It becomes a question of how long the opposing sides are willing to forgo that something. For the most part, Islamic nations are on a much longer chronology. They will inevitably maintain their fervor where industrialized states will not. That is where the clearest comparison to Iraq is made; we may remain in that nation for one year, or five, or twenty. Iraqis will stay there for ages. The day we leave their civil war will reignite. Then, it is only a matter of how long we are willing to maintain presence (and committ men and money) to something we will inevitably lose. We can win every battle and lose the war. Gen. Mathieu summarized it rather simply; this is a matter for the police, not the army.